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Abstract
We consider the problem of T -Private Information Retrieval with private side information
(TPIR-PSI). In this problem, N replicated databases store K independent messages, and a
user, equipped with a local cache that holds M messages as side information, wishes to retrieve
one of the other K −M messages. The desired message index and the side information must
remain jointly private even if any T of the N databases collude. We show that the capacity
of TPIR-PSI is
(
1 + T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1)−1
. As a special case obtained by setting T = 1,
this result settles the capacity of PIR-PSI, an open problem previously noted by Kadhe et al.
We also consider the problem of symmetric-TPIR with private side information (STPIR-PSI),
where the answers from all N databases reveal no information about any other message besides
the desired message. We show that the capacity of STPIR-PSI is 1 − T
N
if the databases have
access to common randomness (not available to the user) that is independent of the messages,
in an amount that is at least T
N−T
bits per desired message bit. Otherwise, the capacity of
STPIR-PSI is zero.
1 Introduction
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem investigates the privacy of the contents downloaded
from public databases. In the classical form of PIR [1], a user wishes to, as efficiently as possible, re-
trieve one of K messages that are replicated across N non-colluding databases while preserving the
privacy of the desired message index. Since its first formulation by Chor et al. in [1], the PIR prob-
lem has been studied extensively in computer science and cryptography under both information-
theoretic and computational privacy constraints [2–6]. While studies of PIR typically seek to
optimize both the upload and download costs, recently there has been a burst of activity aimed
at capacity characterizations for information-theoretic PIR under the assumption of large message
sizes, so that the communication cost is dominated by the download cost [7–12]. The capacity of PIR
was defined in [9] as the maximum number of bits of desired message that can be privately down-
loaded per bit of total downloaded information from all the servers. In order to summarize some of
the capacity results for PIR, let us define the function Ψ(A,B) =
(
1 +A+A2 + · · ·+AB−1
)−1
for
positive real number A and positive integer B. Correspondingly, Ψ(A,∞) = 1−A for A < 1. The
capacity of PIR was characterized in [9] as CPIR = Ψ(1/N,K). The capacity of T -PIR, where the
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privacy of the user’s desired message index must be protected against collusion among any set of
up to T servers, was characterized in [13] as CTPIR = Ψ(T/N,K). The capacity of symmetric PIR
(SPIR), where the user learns nothing about the database besides his desired message, was shown
in [14] to be CSPIR = Ψ(1/N,∞), and the capacity of STPIR, with both symmetric privacy and ro-
bustness against collusion among any T servers, was characterized in [15] as CSTPIR = Ψ(T/N,∞).
Capacity characterizations have also been found for a number of other variants of PIR, such as PIR
with MDS coded storage [12], multi-message PIR [16], multi-round PIR [17], secure PIR [18], and
PIR with side information [19–28]. Especially relevant to this work is the problem of PIR with side
information.
The recent focus on capacity of PIR with side-information started with the work on cache-aided
PIR by Tandon [19], where the user has enough local cache memory to store a fraction r of all
messages as side information. In this model, the side information can be any function of the K
messages (subject to the storage constraint) and is globally known to both the user and all the
databases. The capacity for this setting is characterized in [19] as Ψ(1/N,K)/(1 − r).
Formulations where databases are not aware of the side information were introduced by Kadhe
et al. in [20]. In their model the side information is comprised of M messages cached by the
user, and the databases are not aware of the identities of these M cached messages. This model
gives rise to two interesting variants of PIR with side information depending on whether or not the
privacy of the side information must also be preserved from the databases. PIR with non-private
side information (PIR-NSI) refers to the assumption that the privacy of side information need not
be preserved, while PIR with private side information (PIR-PSI) implies that the joint privacy of
the desired message and the side information must be preserved.
For PIR-NSI with a single database (N = 1), Kadhe et al. showed in [20] that the capacity
is ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1. The single-database setting has seen rapid progress in various directions [23–26, 28].
However, PIR-NSI with multiple databases turns out to be considerably more challenging. In [20],
Kadhe et al. provide an achievable scheme for PIR-NSI with multiple databases (N > 1), which
achieves the rate Ψ(1/N,K/(M +1)) when (M +1) | K. In spite of some progress in this direction
[21,22,27], the capacity of PIR-NSI generally remains open1 for multiple databases.
For PIR-PSI with a single database (N = 1), Kadhe et al. found in [20] that the capacity is
(K −M)−1. The capacity of PIR-PSI with more than one database was left as an open problem
in [20]. Remarkably, neither a general achievable scheme nor a converse was known in this case. It
is this open problem that motivates this work.
The first contribution of this work is to show that the capacity of PIR-PSI is CPIR-PSI =
Ψ(1/N,K − M), for arbitrary number of databases N , thus settling this open problem. As a
generalization, we show that the capacity of TPIR-PSI, i.e., PIR-PSI where up to T databases may
collude, is CTPIR-PSI = Ψ(T/N,K−M). Evidently, the effect of private side information on capacity
is the same as if the number of messages in TPIR was reduced from K to K−M [13]. Remarkably,
this is also the capacity if the side-information is globally known to all databases as well.
As the second contribution of this work, we characterize the capacity of STPIR-PSI, i.e., PIR
with private side information with symmetric privacy and robustness against any T -colluding
servers. We show CTPIR-PSI = Ψ(T/N,∞), provided that the databases have access to common
randomness (not available to the user) in the amount that is at least T/(N − T ) bits per queried
message bit. Otherwise, the capacity of STPIR-PSI is zero. Note that this is identical to the
capacity of STPIR with no side information [15].
1The converse in [27] does not cover the scope of PIR-NSI, because the privacy condition assumed in [27] is not a
necessary condition for PIR-NSI schemes.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the problem statements.
Section 3 presents the main results, i.e., the capacity characterizations of TPIR-PSI and STPIR-
PSI. The proofs of the capacity results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, and we conclude
with Section 6.
Notation: We use bold font for random variables to distinguish them from deterministic vari-
ables, that are shown in normal font. For integers z1 < z2, [z1 : z2] represents the set {z1, z1 +
1, · · · , z2} and (z1 : z2) represents the vector (z1, z1 + 1, · · · , z2). The compact notation [z] rep-
resents [1 : z] for positive integer z. For random variables Wi, i = 1, 2, . . . , and a set of positive
integers S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn}, where s1 < s2 < · · · < sn, the notation W S represents the vector
(Ws1 ,Ws2 , · · · ,Wsn). For a matrix G and a vector S, the notation G[S, :] represents the subma-
trix of G formed by retaining only the rows corresponding to the elements of the vector S. o(L)
represents a function of L such that limL→∞ o(L)/L = 0. Fq represents the finite field of size q.
2 Problem Statements
2.1 TPIR-PSI: T -Private Information Retrieval with Private Side Information
The TPIR-PSI problem is parametrized by (K,M,N, T ). Consider K independent messages
W [K] = (W1, · · · ,WK), each containing L independent and uniform bits, i.e.,
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK), (1)
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L. (2)
There are N databases and each database stores all K messages W1, · · · ,WK . A user is equipped
with a local cache and has M (M < K) messages as side information. Let S = {i1, i2, · · · , iM}
be M distinct indices chosen uniformly from [K]. These M cached messages are represented as
W S = (Wi1 , · · · ,WiM ). S is not known to the databases. A user wishes to retrieve WΘ, where
Θ is a message index uniformly chosen from [K]\S, as efficiently as possible, while revealing no
information about (Θ,S) to any colluding subsets of up to T out of the N databases. Note the
following independence,
H(Θ,S,W1,W2, · · · ,WK) = H(Θ,S) +H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK). (3)
In order to retrieve WΘ, the user generates N queries Q
[Θ,S]
1 , · · · ,Q
[Θ,S]
N with knowledge of
(Θ,S,WS). Since the queries are generated with no knowledge of the other K −M messages, the
queries must be independent of them,
I
(
Θ, S,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
1 , · · · ,Q
[Θ,S]
N ;W [K]\S
)
= 0. (4)
The user sends query Q
[Θ,S]
n to the n-th database and in response, the n-th database returns an
answer A
[Θ,S]
n which is a deterministic function of Q
[Θ,S]
n and W [K],
H
(
A[Θ,S]n | Q
[Θ,S]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK
)
= 0. (5)
Upon collecting the answers from all N databases, the user must be able to decode the desired mes-
sage WΘ based on the queries and side information, subject to a probability of error Pe which must
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approach zero as the size of each message, L, approaches infinity. This is called the “correctness”
constraint. From Fano’s inequality, we have
[Correctness] H
(
WΘ | A
[Θ,S]
n ,Q
[Θ,S]
n ,W S ,S,Θ
)
= o(L). (6)
To satisfy the user-privacy constraint that any T colluding databases learn nothing about (Θ,S),
the information available to any T databases (queries, answers and stored messages) must be
independent of (Θ,S). 2 Let T be any subset of [1 : N ], of cardinality |T | = T . Q
[Θ,S]
T represents
the vector of queries corresponding to Q
[Θ,S]
n , n ∈ T . A
[Θ,S]
T is defined as the answer vector
corresponding to A
[Θ,S]
n , n ∈ T . To satisfy the T -privacy requirement we must have
[User privacy] I
(
Θ,S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]
)
= 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (7)
A TPIR-PSI scheme is called feasible if it satisfies the correctness constraint (6) and the user-
privacy constraint (7). For a feasible scheme, the TPIR-PSI rate characterizes asymptotically how
many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit, and is defined as follows.
RTPIR-PSI , lim
L→∞
L
D
, (8)
where D is the expected (over all Θ and S) total number of bits downloaded by the user from all
the databases. The capacity, CTPIR-PSI, is the supremum of RTPIR-PSI over all feasible schemes.
2.2 STPIR-PSI: Symmetric T -Private Information Retrieval with Private Side
Information
In symmetric T -colluding private information retrieval, an additional constraint is imposed: database
privacy, which means that the user does not learn any information aboutW[K] beyond the retrieved
message, WΘ. To facilitate database privacy, suppose the databases share a common random vari-
able U that is not known to the user. It has been shown that without such common randomness,
symmetric PIR is not feasible when there is more than one message [6, 14]. The common random-
ness is independent of the messages, the desired messages index, and the side information index,
so that
H (Θ,S,W1, · · · ,WK ,U) = H (Θ,S) +H (W1) + · · · +H (WK) +H(U). (9)
The answering string A
[Θ,S]
n is a deterministic function of Q
[Θ,S]
n , W [K] and common randomness
U ,
H
(
A[Θ,S]n | Q
[Θ,S]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK ,U
)
= 0. (10)
The correctness condition is the same as (6). The user-privacy condition is
[User privacy] I
(
Θ,S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W[K],U
)
= 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (11)
2Note that the joint privacy of (Θ, S) is a stronger constraint than the marginal privacy of each of Θ and S, i.e.,
I(Θ,S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0 implies both I(Θ;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0 and I(S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0.
However, the reverse is not true, i.e., even if both I(Θ;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0 and I(S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0,
this does not imply that I(Θ, S;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W [K]) = 0.
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Database privacy requires that the user learns nothing about W (Θ,S) = W [K]\({Θ}∪S), i.e., mes-
sages other than his desired message and side-information. Therefore,
[Database privacy] I
(
W
(Θ,S)
; Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,A
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ,S,W S
)
= 0. (12)
An STPIR-PSI scheme is called feasible if it satisifes the correctness constraint (6), the user-
privacy constraint (11) and the database-privacy constraint (12). For a feasible scheme, the STPIR-
PSI rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit. The
capacity, CSTPIR-PSI, is the supremum of rates over all feasible STPIR-PSI schemes.
3 Main Results
The following theorem presents our first result, the capacity of TPIR-PSI.
Theorem 1 For the TPIR-PSI problem with K messages, N databases and M (M < K) side
information messages, the capacity is
CTPIR-PSI =
(
1 +
T
N
+
(
T
N
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1)−1
. (13)
The following observations place Theorem 1 in perspective.
1. The expression CTPIR-PSI equals the capacity of TPIR withK−M messages [13]. Evidently, the
impact of private side information is equivalent to reducing the effective number of messages
from K to K −M .
2. The capacity result stays the same if the side information is globally known, i.e., not only the
user, but also the databases are knowledgeable about the side information.3 It is remarkable
that the capacity of PIR with public side information is the same as the capacity of PIR with
private side information, but not the same as the capacity of the intermediate setting where
each of Θ and S is private, but (Θ, S) are not jointly private. It is easy to find examples
(see [20]) even with only one database where the achievable rate for the latter setting exceeds
the capacity in (13). For example consider N = 1 database that stores K = 4 messages, of
which M = 1 message is available to the user as side information. For PIR-PSI, where the
joint privacy of (Θ, S) must be preserved, the capacity is 1/3. The capacity is also 1/3 if S
is public, i.e., known to the database. However, the PIR-NSI scheme in [20], which preserves
the privacy of Θ and the privacy of S individually (but not their joint privacy), has capacity
1/2 which is strictly larger.
Our second result is the capacity of STPIR-PSI, presented in the following theorem.
3If the M side information messages are globally known, the capacity is Cg =
(
1 + T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1)−1
.
The achievable scheme is the TPIR scheme of [13] after the cached messages are eliminated. The converse bound can
be proved as follows. Suppose the capacity is greater than Cg, then there is a scheme Π that achieves a larger rate
than Cg in the presence of the M globally known messages. Consider a TPIR problem with K −M messages. It can
be assumed that there are M globally known dummy messages. With this globally known side information, the user
can use the scheme Π to retrieve the message and to achieve a rate larger than Cg, which violates the capacity of
TPIR. Therefore, the capacity of TPIR with globally known side information is Cg.
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Theorem 2 For the STPIR-PSI problem with K ≥ 2 messages, N databases and M (M < K)
side information messages, the capacity is
CSTPIR-PSI =


1, if M = K − 1,
1− T
N
, if M < K − 1 and ρ ≥ T
N−T ,
0, otherwise,
(14)
where ρ = H(U)
L
is the amount of common randomness available to the databases, normalized by
the message size.
The following observations are in order.
1. When there is only K = 1 message, or when there are M = K− 1 side information messages,
the database-privacy constraint is satisfied trivially, so STPIR reduces to the TPIR setting
and the capacity is 1. Note that for symmetric PIR without side information, when K ≥ 2,
the common randomness is necessary for feasibility. However, for STPIR-PSI, if there are
M = K − 1 side information messages, then common randomness is not needed.
2. When K ≥ 2 and M < K − 1, then CSTPIR-PSI only depends on the number of databases N ,
the colluding parameter T , and the amount of common randomness. It is independent of the
number of messages K and the number of side information messages M .
3. CSTPIR-PSI is equal to the capacity of STPIR without side information, which is the result of
Theorem 1 in [15]. Namely, utilizing the side information does not help improve the capacity.
In fact, in the achievable scheme, side information is not used to generate queries.
4. The capacity of STPIR-PSI is strictly smaller than the capacity of TPIR-PSI, which means
that the additional requirement of preserving database privacy strictly penalizes the capacity.
However, the penalty vanishes in the regime of large number of messages, i.e., CTPIR-PSI >
CSTPIR-PSI for any finite K and CTPIR-PSI → CSTPIR-PSI when K →∞.
5. Theorem 2 can be also applied to the STPIR with globally known side information.4
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Achievability
The backbone of the achievable scheme for TPIR-PSI with parameters (K,M,N, T ) is the achiev-
able scheme of TPIR [13]. We inherit the steps of the query structure construction and query
structure specialization. The novel element of the achievable scheme is query redundancy removal
based on the side information. To illustrate how this idea works, we present two examples with
small values of K,M,N and T , and then generalize it to arbitrary K,M,N and T .
4.1.1 Example with (K,M,N, T ) = (3, 1, 2, 1)
We start with the achievable scheme of PIR (T = 1). Suppose there are N = 2 databases and
K = 3 messages, one of which is known to the user as side information. Let each message consist
4The explanation is similar to that for TPIR with globally known side information as in the previous footnote.
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of NK = 8 symbols from a finite field Fq that is large enough so that a systematic maximum
distance separable (MDS) code with length 13 and dimension 7 exists. A systematic code is a code
in which the input data is embedded in the encoded output. According to the query structure
construction and specialization of [13], the messages W1,W2,W3 ∈ F
8
q are represented as 8 × 1
column vectors over Fq. Let U1,U2,U3 ∈ F
8×8
q represent random matrices chosen privately by
the user, independently and uniformly from all 8 × 8 full-rank matrices over Fq. Without loss of
generality, suppose (Θ,S) = (1, {3}), i.e., the user knows W3 as side information, and wishes to
retrieve W1. Define the 8× 1 column vectors a(1:8), b(1:8), c(1:8) ∈ F
8
q as below
a(1:8) = U1W1, b(1:8) = U2W2, c(1:8) = U3W3. (15)
The downloaded symbols from each database are represented below. We use DBi to represent the
ith database.
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
a3 + b2 a5 + b1
a4 + c2 a6 + c1
b3 + c3 b4 + c4
a7 + b4 + c4 a8 + b3 + c3
Note that the rate achieved by this scheme is RPIR = 4/7 (which is also the capacity in the absence of
side information), since the user recovers 8 desired symbols from a total of 14 downloaded symbols.
However, in the PIR-PSI setting W3 is the side information, which means the user already
knows c(1:8). Specificallly consider the download from DB1, where c1 is redundant. What the user
needs now is only the remaining 6 symbols from DB1. So we take the step of query redundancy
removal. The idea is that the user asks each database to encode the 7 original symbols with
a systematic (13, 7) MDS code and downloads only the 6 linear combinations corresponding to
the non-systematic part, called parity symbols. Since the user already knows c1, along with the
6 downloaded symbols, this gives him 7 symbols of the MDS code, from which he can recover
all 7 symbols of the original PIR scheme. Formally, let Gse×f denote the generator matrix of a
systematic (e, f) MDS code (e.g., a Reed Solomon code). The generator matrix does not need to
be random, i.e., it may be globally known. SupposeGs13×7 = [V7×6 | I7×7]
′, where I7×7 is the identity
matrix. Denote by vector Xi ∈ F
7
q the symbols downloaded from DBi after the query structure
construction and specialization. Therefore X1 = (a1, b1, c1,a3 + b2,a4 + c2, b3 + c3,a7 + b4 + c4)
and X2 = (a2, b2, c2,a5 + b1,a6 + c1, b4 + c4,a8 + b3 + c3). With query redundancy removal,
from DB1 and DB2 the user downloads V
′
7×6X1 and V
′
7×6X2 instead of X1, X2. The correctness
constraint is satisfied because of the property of MDS code, i.e., given c1, c2, V
′
7×6X1 and V
′
7×6X2,
the user is able to decode X1 and X2. The privacy is essentially inherited from the original PIR
scheme and the fact that the MDS code is fixed a priori, i.e., it does not depend on (Θ,S). Thus,
the rate achieved with private side information is RPIR-PSI = 8/12 = 2/3 = (1 + 1/2)
−1 which
matches the capacity for this setting.
4.1.2 Example with (K,M,N, T ) = (3, 2, 3, 2)
The second example allows any T = 2 databases to collude. Consider the case where (K,M,N, T ) =
(3, 2, 3, 2), i.e., there are 3 messages and 3 databases. Assume the user knows W2 and W3 as side
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information and wishes to retrieve W1. Based on the query structure construction and specializa-
tion, let each message consist of NK = 27 symbols from a large enough finite field Fq. The messages
W1,W2,W3 ∈ F
27
q are 27 × 1 column vectors and U1,U2,U3 ∈ F
27×27
q represent random matrices
chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 27× 27 full-rank matrices over
Fq. Let Ge×f denote the generator matrix of an (e, f) MDS code (e.g., a Reed Solomon code). The
generator matrices Ge×f need not be systematic or random, and may be globally known. Define
the 27× 1 column vectors a(1:27), b(1:27), c(1:27) ∈ F
27
q as follows.
a(1:27) = U1W1, (16)
b(1:18) = G18×12U2[(1 : 12), :]W2, (17)
c(1:18) = G18×12U3[(1 : 12), :]W3, (18)
b(19:27) = G9×6U2[(13 : 18), :]W2, (19)
c(19:27) = G9×6U3[(13 : 18), :]W3, (20)
where U2[(1 : 18), :] and U3[(1 : 18), :] are 18 × 27 matrices comprised of the first 18 rows of U2
and U3, respectively. Note that the same generator matrix G18×12 is used in (17) and (18), and
the same generator matrix G9×6 is used in (19) and (20). The scheme below correctly recovers the
queried message and maintains user privacy even if 2 databases collude [13].
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1,a2,a3,a4 a5,a6,a7,a8 a9,a10,a11,a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
b19 + c19 b21 + c21 b23 + c23
b20 + c20 b22 + c22 b24 + c24
a25 + b25 + c25 a26 + b26 + c26 a27 + b27 + c27
Without side information, the achieved rate is RTPIR = 9/19. Note that in this scheme the user
downloads 19 symbols from each database. Now we take the step of query redundancy removal.
Since the user knowsW2,W3 as side information, he does not need to download symbols ofW2,W3,
or the linear combinations comprised of only W2,W3 symbols, i.e., bi, ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 12 and bj +
cj, 19 ≤ j ≤ 24 from the databases. Therefore 10 redundant symbols may be reduced from each
database. Denote by vector Xi ∈ F
19
q the symbols downloaded from DBi after the query structure
construction and specialization. The user asks each database to encode Xi with a systematic
(28, 19) MDS code generator matrix Gs28×19 = [V19×9 | I19×19]
′ and downloads only the 9 linear
combinations corresponding to the parity part, V ′19×9Xi. Consider DB1. Since the user already
knows bi, ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and bj + cj, 19 ≤ j ≤ 20, along with the 9 downloaded symbols, this gives
him 19 symbols of the MDS code, from which he can recover all 19 symbols of the original TPIR
scheme. The correctness and privacy are inherited from the original scheme and the property of
MDS code. The achieved rate is RTPIR-PSI = 27/27 = 1, which matches the capacity for this setting.
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4.1.3 Arbitrary (K,M,N, T )
Scheme description. Now we are ready to present the achievable scheme for arbitrary (K,M,N, T ).
For each database, let p1 denote the number of symbols to be downloaded in the original TPIR
scheme of [13]. Out of these p1 symbols, let p2 (p2 < p1) denote the number of symbols that
are already known to the user based on his side information. Denote by vector Xi ∈ F
p1
q the
symbols downloaded from DBi after the query structure construction and specialization accord-
ing to [13]. For each database, use a systematic (2p1 − p2, p1) MDS code with generator matrix
Gs(2p1−p2)×p1 =
[
Vp1×(p1−p2) | Ip1×p1
]′
to encode the p1 symbols into 2p1 − p2 symbols, of which p1
are systematic, and download only the p1 − p2 parity symbols, V
′
p1×(p1−p2)
Xi.
Note that the user does not need to know the realization of side information S or WS in order to
construct the queries. This is because the systematic MDS code in the query redundancy removal
does not depend on S or WS. During the decoding, S and WS are only used after the answers
from the databases are collected. Therefore, the privacy of this TPIR-PSI scheme is inherited from
the privacy of the original TPIR scheme. Correctness follows from the MDS property because in
addition to the p1−p2 downloaded symbols from DBi, i.e., V
′
p1×(2p1−p2)
Xi, the user provides the p2
symbols that he already knows, to obtain a total of p1 symbols from the MDS code. Since any p1
symbols from an MDS code suffice to recover the original p1 symbols, the user recovers Xi. Then
the correctness is inherited from the correctness of the original TPIR scheme. All that remains is
to calculate the rate achieved by this scheme.
Rate calculation. For the TPIR scheme of [13], after the query structure construction and
specialization, the response from each database is comprised of K layers. Over the k-th layer,
the downloads are in the form of sums of k symbols, each from one distinct message, called k-
sum. Note that there are
(
K
k
)
possible “types” of k-sums and (N − T )k−1TK−k distinct instances5
of each type of k-sum in k-th layer. So the total number of elements contained in layer k is(
K
k
)
(N−T )k−1TK−k. Therefore, the total number of symbols to be downloaded from each database
is p1 =
∑K
k=1
(
K
k
)
(N − T )k−1TK−k.
The next step is to calculate, out of these p1 symbols, how many are already known to the
user based on his side information. Suppose the user knows the M messages Wi1 , · · · ,WiM ,
{i1, · · · , iM} ∈ [K] as side information beforehand. Thus the user knows all linear combinations
that are comprised of symbols from theseM messages. In terms of layer k (k ≤M), the user knows
all the instances of k-sum that contain only symbols Wj1 ,Wj2 , · · · ,Wjk , where {j1, j2, · · · , jk} ⊂
{i1, · · · , iM}. So the total number of symbols known to the user corresponding to each database is
p2 =
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
(N − T )k−1TK−k. Notice that p1 can be simplified as,
p1 =
K∑
k=1
(N − T )k−1TK−k
(
K
k
)
(21)
=
∑K
k=0(N − T )
kTK−k
(
K
k
)
− TK
N − T
(22)
=
NK − TK
N − T
. (23)
5The term (N − T )k−1TK−k comes from the undesired message exploitation step (Step 4) of achievability in [13]
and can be verified recursively. A detailed analysis in similar flavor can be found in [9].
9
And p2 can be simplified as,
p2 =
M∑
k=1
(N − T )k−1TK−k
(
M
k
)
(24)
= TK−M
M∑
k=1
(N − T )k−1TM−k
(
M
k
)
(25)
=
TK−M(NM − TM )
N − T
. (26)
From each database the number of downloaded symbols of desired messages can be calculated as,
m =
K∑
k=1
(N − T )k−1TK−k
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
= NK−1. (27)
Therefore, the rate achieved is
RTPIR-PSI =
Nm
N(p1 − p2)
(28)
=
NK−1(N − T )
(NK − TK)− TK−M(NM − TM )
(29)
=
1− T
N
1− ( T
N
)K−M
(30)
=
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1)−1
. (31)
(32)
This matches the capacity of TPIR-PSI, thus completing the proof of achievability for Theorem 1.
4.2 Converse
Before presenting the general converse, let us start with a simple example for ease of exposition.
4.2.1 Converse for (K,M,N, T ) = (3, 1, 2, 1)
Let S be a set whose elements are all possible realizations of S, i.e., S = {S
∣∣ S ⊂ [K], |S| =M}.
The total download is bounded as,
D ≥ H(A
[Θ,S]
[N ] ) (33)
≥ H(A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W S,Θ,S) (34)
≥ min
S∈S,θ∈[K]\S
H(A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W S ,Θ = θ,S = S). (35)
We will derive a lower bound on the entropy in (35) that holds for all (θ, S). For (K,M,N, T ) =
(3, 1, 2, 1), without loss of generality suppose message W1 is known as side-information and W2 is
desired. We bound the total download as,
D ≥ H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 ,A
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
(36)
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(6)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 ,A
[Θ,S]
2 ,W2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (37)
= H
(
W2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 ,A
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,W2,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (38)
≥ L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,W2,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (39)
= L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2,Θ = 2,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (40)
(7)
= L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (41)
where (39) holds because of (2), (4), the chain rule and non-negativity of entropy. Equation (40)
holds since given Θ = 2,S = {1}, we know that A
[Θ,S]
1 ↔
(
Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2
)
↔ Q
[Θ,S]
2 is a Markov
chain.6
Similarly,
D ≥ L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,W1,W2,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+ o(L). (42)
Adding (41) and (42) we have
2D ≥ 2L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 |W1,W2,Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
2 |W1,W2,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (43)
≥ 2L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
1 ,A
[Θ,S]
2 |W1,W2,Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (44)
≥ 2L+H
(
W3 |W1,W2,Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
+ o(L) (45)
= 2L+ L+ o(L) (46)
= 3L+ o(L), (47)
Here (45) holds because from
(
W1,W2,Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,Q
[Θ,S]
2 ,Θ = 3,S = {1}
)
one can recover W3 with
vanishing probability of error. Since the same argument holds for all realizations (Θ, S) = (θ, S),
this gives us the bound on the capacity of TPIR-PSI with (K,M,N, T ) = (3, 1, 2, 1) as CTPIR-PSI ≤
2
3 .
4.2.2 Converse for Arbitrary (K,M,N, T )
If M = K − 1, then the capacity is 1 which is trivial. So let us assume that M < K − 1. For
compact notation, let us define
D(K,S, θ, V ) , H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[V ],Θ = θ,S = S
)
. (48)
6This is easily verified because by the chain rule of mutual information, I(A
[Θ,S]
1 ;Q
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2,Θ =
2,S = {1}) = I(A
[Θ,S]
1 ;Q
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W{1,2,3},Θ = 2,S = {1}) + I(W3;Q
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2,Θ = 2,S =
{1})− I(W3;Q
[Θ,S]
2 | Q
[Θ,S]
1 ,W1,W2,A
[Θ,S]
1 ,Θ = 2,S = {1}). The first two mutual information terms on the right
hand side are equal to zero because of (5) and (4), respectively, leaving only the negative mutual information term
which must also be zero because mutual information cannot be negative.
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Here W[V ] = (W1,W2, · · · ,WV ) represents the messages that appear in the conditioning. Also,
define an arbitrary T ⊂ [N ] with cardinality |T | = T which represents the set of indices of colluding
databases.
Without loss of generality, let us consider S = [M ], Θ =M + 1. Then, we have
D(K, [M ],M + 1,M) (49)
= H(A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M ],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]) (50)
(6)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,WM+1 | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M ],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (51)
= H
(
WM+1 | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M ],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M ],WM+1,Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (52)
= L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (53)
≥ L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (54)
= L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 1,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (55)
(7)
= L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 2,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (56)
≥ L+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 2,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L), (57)
where (53) holds because messages are independent, and queries are independent of the messages.
Equation (55) holds because given Θ = M + 1,S = [M ], A
[Θ,S]
T ↔
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,W[M+1]
)
↔ Q
[Θ,S]
[N ]\T
is a Markov chain. There are a total of
(
N
T
)
such subsets T . Writing (57) for all such subsets and
adding those inequalities, we obtain,(
N
T
)
D(K, [M ],M + 1,M) (58)
≥
(
N
T
)
L+
∑
T :T ⊂[N ],|T |=T
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 2,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (59)
≥
(
N
T
)
L+
(
N
T
)
T
N
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] | Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,W[M+1],Θ =M + 2,S = [M ]
)
+ o(L) (60)
=
(
N
T
)
L+
(
N
T
)
T
N
D(K, [M ],M + 2,M + 1) + o(L), (61)
where (60) follows from Han’s inequality. Therefore,
D(K, [M ],M + 1,M) ≥ L+
T
N
D(K, [M ],M + 2,M + 1) + o(L). (62)
Proceeding along these lines, we have,
D(K, [M ],M + 1,M) ≥ L+
T
N
D(K, [M ],M + 2,M + 1) + o(L) (63)
≥ L+
T
N
(
L+
T
N
D(K, [M ],M + 3,M + 2)
)
+ o(L) (64)
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≥ · · · (65)
≥ L+
T
N
(
L+ · · ·+
T
N
(
L+
T
N
D(K, [M ],K,K − 1)
))
+ o(L) (66)
where D(K, [M ],K,K − 1) ≥ L. Therefore,
D(K, [M ],M + 1,M) ≥ L+
T
N
L+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1
L+ o(L) (67)
= L
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · · +
(
T
N
)K−M−1)
+ o(L). (68)
Noting that the above argument holds similarly for any (θ, S) gives us the upper bound on the rate
of TPIR-PSI as
R = lim
L→∞
L
D
(69)
≤
(
1 +
T
N
+
(
T
N
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−M−1)−1
. (70)
Thus, the proof of converse for Theorem 1 is complete.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
5.1 Achievability
When M = K − 1, the user can download the sum of all the messages from one database and get
the desired message with side information. The rate is 1, achieving the capacity. Note that in this
case, common randomness among databases is not required. When M < K − 1, the achievable
scheme can directly use the scheme of STPIR [14,15], and the side information is simply not used.
5.2 Converse
When M = K − 1, it is obvious that 1 is an upper bound, since any rates cannot be larger than 1.
When M < K − 1, we show that 1 − T
N
is an upper bound. Let S be the set of subsets of [K] of
cardinality M , i.e., it contains all possible realizations of S. We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For all S ∈ S, θ, θ′ ∈ [K]\S, and T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T ,
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WΘ,WS ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WΘ,WS ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
,
(71)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
. (72)
Proof: It follows from the user-privacy constraint (11) and the non-negativity of mutual infor-
mation, that for all S ∈ S, T ⊂ [N ], |T | = T
I
(
Θ;Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,W[K] | S = S
)
= 0, (73)
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which implies that ∀θ, θ′ ∈ [K]\S,
H
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,Wθ,WS | Θ = θ,S = S
)
= H
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,A
[Θ,S]
T ,Wθ,WS | Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
(74)
H
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Wθ,WS | Θ = θ,S = S
)
= H
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Wθ,WS | Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
. (75)
Subtracting (75) from (74) yields (71). Equation (72) is similarly obtained.
Proof of the bound R ≤ 1 − T/N . Let us start with an intuitive understanding of the upper
bound, R ≤ 1 − T/N . Due to database privacy, given the side information, the answers from all
N databases should be independent of the non-queried messages. At the same time, the answers
from any T databases should contain no information about the queried message index since the
user privacy must be preserved. Combining these two facts, given the side information, the answers
from any T databases should contain no information about any individual message, whether desired
or undesired. As a result, the useful information about the desired message must come from the
remaining N − T databases. Thus, the download per database must be at least 1/(N − T ) times
the entropy of the desired message.
The formal proof is as follows. Since M < K − 1, for any S ∈ S, there exist at least 2 messages
that are not in the set S. Any feasible STPIR-PSI scheme must satisfy the database-privacy
constraint (12),
0 = I
(
W(Θ,S);Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,S,Θ
)
(76)
Therefore, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T,∀S ∈ S, and for all distinct θ, θ′ ∈ [K]\S,
0 = I
(
Wθ′ ;A
[Θ,S]
T ,Q
[Θ,S]
T |WS ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
(77)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Wθ′ ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
(78)
(71)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T | Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS ,Wθ′ ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
,
(79)
where (77) is based on (76). According to the correctness condition,
L = H (Wθ′)
(6)
= I
(
Wθ′ ;A
[Θ,S]
[N ]
|WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ]
,Θ = θ′,S = S
)
+ o(L) (80)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |Wθ′ ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(81)
≤ H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ′ ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(82)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ]
|WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ]
,Θ = θ′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ′ ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L),
(83)
(79)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(84)
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(72)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(85)
≤ H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L),
(86)
where (83) follows since given Θ = θ′,S = S, A
[Θ,S]
T ↔
(
Q
[Θ,S]
T ,WS
)
↔ Q
[Θ,S]
[N ]\T is a Markov
chain. Writing (86) for all T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T , and adding those inequalities we obtain,(
N
T
)
L ≤
(
N
T
)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−
∑
T :|T |=T
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L) (87)
≤
(
N
T
)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−
(
N
T
)
T
N
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L) (88)
=
(
N
T
)(
1−
T
N
)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
+ o(L), (89)
where (88) is due to Han’s inequality. Since this inequality is true for all S ∈ S, θ′ ∈ [K]\S, it is
also true when averaged across them, so,(
N
T
)
L ≤
(
N
T
)(
1−
T
N
)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ,S
)
+ o(L) (90)
≤
(
N
T
)(
1−
T
N
)
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ]
)
+ o(L) (91)
≤
(
N
T
)(
1−
T
N
)
D + o(L), (92)
where (91) holds because dropping conditioning does not reduce entropy. Therefore, R = limL→∞
L
D
≤
1 − T
N
, and we have shown that the rate of any feasible STPIR-SI scheme cannot be more than
1− T
N
.
Proof of the bound ρ ≥ T/(N −T ). Let us first explain the intuition behind this bound on the
size of the common randomness U that should be available to all databases but not to the user.
We have already shown that the normalized size of the answer from any individual database must
be at least L/(N − T ). Due to the user and database privacy constraints, the answers from any T
databases are independent of the messages. Therefore, to ensure database privacy, the amount of
common randomness must be no smaller than the size of the answers from T databases.
The formal proof is as follows. Suppose a feasible STPIR-PSI scheme exists that achieves a
non-zero rate. Then we show that it must satisfy ρ ≥ T/(N − T ). For S = S ∈ S and for
Θ = θ ∈ [K]\S, consider the answering strings A
[Θ,S]
1 , · · · ,A
[Θ,S]
N and the side information WS ,
from which the user can retrieve Wθ. According to the database-privacy constraint, we have
0 = I
(
W(θ,S) ;A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
(93)
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(6)
= I
(
W
(θ,S)
;A
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Wθ |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L) (94)
(9)
= I
(
W
(θ,S)
;A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L) (95)
≥ I
(
W(θ,S) ;A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L) (96)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |W[K],Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(97)
(10)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |W[K],Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |W[K],Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,U ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L) (98)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
− I
(
U ;A
[Θ,S]
T |W[K],Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
+ o(L)
(99)
≥ H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |Wθ,WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H(U) + o(L) (100)
(79)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ
′,S = S
)
−H(U) + o(L) (101)
(72)
= H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−H(U) + o(L). (102)
Adding (102) for all T ⊂ [N ], |T | = T , we obtain,
0 ≥
∑
T : T ⊂[N ],|T |=T
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
T |WS,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−
(
N
T
)
H(U) + o(L) (103)
≥
(
N
T
)
T
N
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
T ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−
(
N
T
)
H(U) + o(L) (104)
≥
(
N
T
)
T
N
H
(
A
[Θ,S]
[N ] |WS ,Q
[Θ,S]
[N ] ,Θ = θ,S = S
)
−
(
N
T
)
H(U) + o(L) (105)
(89)
≥
(
N
T
)
T
N
(
N
N − T
)
L−
(
N
T
)
H(U) + o(L). (106)
⇒ H(U) ≥
(
T
N − T
)
L+ o(L), (107)
⇒ ρ =
H(U)
L
≥
T
N − T
(letting L→∞). (108)
Note that (104) is due to Han’s inequality. Thus the amount of common randomness normalized
by the message size for any feasible STPIR-PSI scheme cannot be less than T/(N − T ).
6 Conclusion
The capacity of TPIR-PSI and the capacity of STPIR-PSI are characterized. As a special case of
TPIR-PSI obtained by setting T = 1, the result solves the capacity of PIR-PSI, an open problem
highlighted by Kadhe et al. in [20]. Notably, the results of our work (initially limited to capacity of
PIR-PSI for T = 1 as reported in our original ArXiv posting in 2017 [29]) have subsequently been
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generalized to multi-message PIR-PSI in [30]. Other generalizations, e.g., PIR-PSI with multi-
round communication, secure and/or coded storage, remain promising directions for future work,
as is the capacity characterization for PIR-NSI which remains open for multi-server settings.
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